Defining the intended behaviour of IoT devices is considered as a key aspect to detect and mitigate potential security attacks. In this direction, the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) has been recently standardised to reduce the attack surface of a certain device through the definition of access control policies. However, the semantic model is only intended to provide network level restrictions for the communication of such device. In order to increase the expressiveness of this approach, we propose the use of an automated IoT security testing methodology, so that testing results are used to generate augmented MUD profiles, in which additional security aspects are considered. For the enforcement of these profiles, we propose the use of different access control technologies addressing application layer security concerns. Furthermore, the methodology is based on the use of Model-Based Testing (MBT) techniques to automate the generation, design and implementation of security tests. Then, we describe the application of the resulting approach to the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman over COSE (EDHOC) protocol, which represents a standardisation effort to build a lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol for IoT constrained scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
The extension of the so-called Internet of Things (IoT) in our daily lives has brought an increase of the number and impact of potential security attacks. In recent years, different botnets (e.g., Mirai [1] ) have shown that the deployment of IoT devices can compromise critical infrastructures with huge economic losses. This is especially critical in certain scenarios (e.g., involving eHealth devices), which can affect users' safety. To address such security concerns, there is a need to define approaches to reduce the attack surface of the devices. Beyond the use of traditional cryptographic and access control techniques, the security aspects of IoT devices should be properly managed through a governance approach to ensure devices behave as expected. However, the specification and enforcement of such aspects can be challenging The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Adnan M. Abu-Mahfouz . in environments where a huge number of IoT devices have the ability to communicate with each other and, sometimes, without the explicit consent of their owners.
To address this issue, the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) [2] is an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard aimed to define the intended behaviour of the device through Access Control Lists (ACLs), in order to restrict the communication to/from a certain device. MUD defines an architecture for obtaining MUD files wherein those policies are specified by using the Yet Another Next Generation (YANG) [3] and JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [4] standards. While MUD was recently standardised (March 2019), it has received a strong interest from the research community and standardisation entities worldwide, such as the National Institute Standards and Technology (NIST) [5] . MUD is focused on the definition of network access control policies. Therefore, these restrictions can be straightforwardly enforced through the Software-Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm, as already proposed in [6] , [7] . However, beyond aspects of the network level, the MUD semantics does not provide the possibility of defining security properties to provide a more fine-grained approach that determines how IoT devices should communicate.
To increase the expressiveness of the MUD standard, an extension of the MUD model is proposed to allow the definition of additional security aspects (e.g., cryptographic algorithms or key sizes to be used), in order to build an augmented MUD profile. The main goal of this extension is to identify a broader set of potential security attacks on a certain device. To do this, the use of a security testing methodology for IoT is considered, so that test results can be used to generate security restrictions that govern the behaviour of a certain device. In particular, such approach is based on [8] , which is, in turn, based on the risk-based security assessment and testing methodologies proposed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [9] . Such approach represents an instantiation of this methodology based on the Model-Based Testing (MBT) technique [10] , which provides a flexible testing process by defining a highlevel view of the System Under Test (SUT). In this way, new tests can be automatically generated from the same model. This aspect is especially relevant for IoT environments, which present a high degree of dynamism and heterogeneity, since the SUT model does not need to be modified. Furthermore, such methodology is extended for the generation and enforcement of MUD profiles. In particular, the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) [11] standard is suggested to represent the test results as a previous step for generating the profile. Then, the integration between the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [12] , and the use of lightweight authorisation credentials through capability-based access control [13] is considered for the enforcement of such augmented MUD profiles. This approach is complementary to the use of SDNs, which has been considered for enforcing network-layer MUD restrictions.
It should be noted that this work represents an extension of [14] by extending the testing approach, in order to build an enriched MUD profile beyond network-layer restrictions. As an example, the resulting solution is applied in a scenario based on the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman over COSE (EDHOC) protocol [15] . EDHOC represents an ongoing standardisation effort for the definition of a lightweight authenticated key exchange mechanism. Indeed, this effort is aligned with the recent establishment of the IETF Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) Working Group (WG). 1 EDHOC is based on the use of the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [16] and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [17] standards. This protocol provides mutual authentication and perfect forward secrecy, and is intended to be used together with the recent Object Security for Constrained RESTful 1 https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/lake/about/ Environments (OSCORE) standard [18] , which uses CBOR and COSE for the protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [19] . In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
• Extension of the MUD model to represent additional security aspects, in order to govern the behaviour of IoT devices through a fine-grained approach • Integration of the automated IoT security testing methodology proposed in [14] to use the corresponding test results for the generation of augmented MUD profiles.
• Enforcement of the extended MUD profiles through the usage of CBOR-encoded authorisation tokens based on [20] , and the XACML standard.
• Use of the XCCDF standard to represent the test results, and the risk associated to the vulnerabilities found through those tests • Application of the resulting approach to EDHOC, which represents an ongoing standardisation effort for the definition of an authentication key exchange to be used in IoT constrained scenarios The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section II reviews the main approaches related with IoT security testing, as well as potential approaches to define and enforce the security behaviour of IoT devices. Section III describes the MUD approach, including the representation format for defining the ACLs. Section IV explains the proposed solution for extending MUD profiles through the use of testing results obtained from the methodology. Then, Section V provides a detailed description of the EDHOC exchange. The application of the testing methodology to EDHOC is presented in Section VI, and based on the testing results, Section VII describes the generation and enforcement of augmented profiles for this application example. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper with an outlook about some future work in this area.
II. STATE OF THE ART
The proposed work is built on top of an IoT security testing methodology to extend the MUD model with more finegrained security aspects. Therefore, in this section, the main approaches for IoT security testing are reviewed to motivate the use of the methodology based on MBT. Furthermore, this section also analyzes potential approaches to define and enforce the security behaviour of IoT devices that are related with the MUD standard.
A. SECURITY TESTING IN IOT
Security testing can be defined as ''the process to determine that an information system protects data and maintains functionality as intended'' [21] . The main goal of this process is to find any potential vulnerability of the SUT that could be exploited by an attacker. The use of security testing techniques has been traditionally considered as a key element to increase users' trust in any Information and Communications Technology (ICT) system. Through the identification and analysis of potential vulnerabilities, the application of security testing approaches is intended to improve the overall security of new software components. Toward this end, there is a plethora of security testing techniques, which can be used depending on the different stages of the software development life-cycle [22] and [23] . However, these approaches must be adapted to cope with the peculiarities of IoT devices and networks.
Indeed, most of security testing approaches set out different challenges to be considered in the IoT context. In some cases, such techniques require manual processes with human interaction, which can be unfeasible in scenarios with a huge number of devices without user interface. Furthermore, the different techniques must consider the need to launch a testing process frequently due to potential changes in the security level of a certain device, for instance, due to software updates, security patches, or the discovery of a new vulnerability after an attack. In addition, the scale and heterogeneity of IoT systems lead to the need of defining automated strategies that can be accommodated to different types of devices and networks that could employ different underlying protocols and technologies. These techniques must be additionally complemented with suitable data formats to specify test results consistently, in order to ensure an inter-operable IoT security testing ecosystem.
Different security testing techniques have been considered in IoT scenarios. One of the most popular approaches is represented by penetration testing, in which real-world attacks are simulated to identify vulnerabilities [24] - [26] . Another related approach is fuzzing testing, which is based on using non-valid inputs to stress the SUT [27] - [30] . Fuzzing testing can be classified on data fuzzing testing [31] , in which random data are used as an input to test the SUT, and behavioural fuzzing testing [32] that produces sequences of invalid messages. One of the main advantages of these approaches is the high number of tools that can help to automate the process. Indeed, most of these works make use of different tools to automate the discovery of new vulnerabilities in a certain IoT system. For example, [33] proposes the tool PENTOS, which can be employed to perform different attacks against a certain SUT in an automated way. These works highlight the need for automating the testing process in IoT scenarios. A further review of the main testing techniques within the IoT context can be found in [34] .
As an alternative to these approaches and related to the need for automated testing processes, MBT represents a promising technique to be considered in IoT scenarios, due to the possibility of generating tests from the SUT model in an automated way. This way, MBT can manage the security testing process in a cost-effective and efficient way [10] , by abstracting the SUT with a model that is used to generate the different tests. The model could represent the SUT, the associated environment or the test itself. The increasing interest has fostered the development of different tools to support the use of MBT in different use cases [35] . MBT is also largely considered in IoT, as proposed in several works, such as [36] - [39] .
Based on this, MBT is employed in the proposed security testing approach as one of the main building blocks to automate the testing process. In particular, the SUT is modelled through Unified Modelling Language (UML) class diagrams, while the behaviour is expressed in Object Constraint Language (OCL) [40] . It should be noted that this methodology has been defined as a core component of the security certification framework proposed in [8] , which is intended to automate the process for security assessment of a certain IoT system. In this paper, this methodology is extended to enrich the MUD model, so that testing results can refine the MUD behavioural profile. In particular, XCCDF [11] is used to represent the test results. XCCDF is a NIST specification and one of the main components of the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) [41] . Unlike previous papers that are mainly focused on security testing aspects, this work integrates security testing results to build augmented MUD profiles to restrict the communication of IoT devices. These profiles are intended to mitigate different potential security attacks by considering a fine-grained approach.
B. DEFINING AND ENFORCING THE INTENDED BEHAVIOUR OF IOT DEVICES
The specification of the intended behaviour of IoT devices could help to mitigate potential security attacks. In this direction, policy-based approaches have been traditionally considered to define the set of allowed and denied actions for a particular system. One of the most prominent examples is the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [12] , which is considered the de facto standard for the definition and enforcement of access control policies. The use of XACML in the IoT context has been considered in previous works, such as [13] and [42] , in which XACML drives the generation of authorisation credentials for the access to IoT devices. One of the main advantages of XACML is the interoperability it offers between the different vendors access control implementations. Also related to access control, token-based approaches have been widely used to enforce authorisation decisions. In addition to wellknown technologies (e.g., OAuth [43] ), the use of capabilitybased access control has been strongly considered in IoT scenarios [13] , [44] . It provides a straightforward approach in which a token includes the permissions of a certain entity. In this direction, this work uses this approach by employing CBOR encoding for a more efficient approach, as already considered by the recent CBOR Web Token (CWT) standard [45] .
Beyond access control aspects, other proposals have been defined to represent additional restrictions of the behaviour of IoT devices. Specifically, [46] proposed a layered architecture for IoT in which a usage access control policy model is employed for security and privacy aspects. The approach is based on the model-based security toolkit Seckit [47] , which provides different meta-models to represent security requirements of the behaviour of an IoT system. As an instantiation of their approach, authors consider the Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol [48] for the development of a policy enforcement point. MQTT is also used in [49] to create a policy enforcement framework for IoT networks. Furthermore, [50] describes an execution policy framework P4SINC for the enforcement of restrictions during the deployment and execution of IoT services.
More focused on network-layer security aspects, [51] and [52] proposed a network security policy enforcement architecture by restricting the network behaviour of IoT devices. Authors argued that the devices' network behaviour is predictable, so it can be easily restricted. These considerations are also suggested by the MUD standard [2] , which is intended to represent the intended network behaviour of IoT devices. This way, they are enabled to signal to the network which sort of access and network functionality they require to properly function. MUD homogenises the specification of network profiles using the YANG standard [3] , and JSON [4] as a serialisation format for compactness and readability compared to eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [53] . These policies are focused on the network level to restrict the communication from/to the device, in order to allow/deny the access through certain ports, protocols and IP addresses. MUD is an IETF standard, and it is supported by NIST [54] , [55] , which is considering the creation of a National Thing Behaviour Database (NTBD) 2 by using standard specifications (such as MUD). An additional advantage of the MUD standard is the potential integration with the SDN paradigm for the enforcement of the restrictions included in a MUD profile. Indeed, this integration has been recently considered by different works, such as [7] and [56] by using OpenFlow [57] .
Based on these aspects, this proposal uses the MUD standard for the definition of behavioural profiles as a way to protect the device and the network in which it is being installed. Furthermore, this work also describes additional security aspects that could help to detect and mitigate additional potential attacks on a certain IoT device. The proposal is based on the integration of an automated IoT security testing methodology to refine the behaviour specified by MUD profiles. It should be noted that other works have proposed the use of network traffic analysis to automate the generation of MUD profiles [58] , [59] . In fact, part of the proposed testing methodology uses traffic analysis tools to obtain security parameters that can be used to restrict the network behaviour of a device. However, the proposed MUD extension also adds additional access control restrictions at application layer. Therefore, although SDNs have been strongly used to enforce MUD restrictions [6] , [7] , [56] , the enforcement of such rules require complementary mechanisms. Towards this end, we use a combination of a policybased approach (i.e., XACML) and the capability-based approach, so that capability tokens are generated in case of a positive authorisation decision. 2 https://www.nist.gov/itl/applied-cybersecurity/nist-initiatives-iot Before describing the approach, a more detailed description of the MUD standard is provided in the next section.
III. MANUFACTURER USAGE DESCRIPTION (MUD)
The main purpose of the MUD specification [2] is to restrict the threat and attack surface of a certain specific-purpose device. MUD provides a scalable and flexible approach to the definition of network access policies beyond the use of IP addresses to enable communications with other services. In particular, a manufacturer could specify to allow the access to specific services in the cloud, but also the communication with devices of the same manufacturer. To provide a more fine-grained definition of access control rules, MUD also enables to specify specific protocols and ports for each communication. Moreover, it provides the possibility of extending the scheme, so that manufacturers can express other types of conditions or policies according to their needs. In addition, although the MUD is focused on network access control policies, potential MUD model extensions are envisioned, for example, to consider Quality of Service (QoS) aspects of the communications. One of the main advantages of the MUD approach is that the definition of the devices' behavioural profiles is a responsibility for the manufacturer (instead of the typical network administrator). In fact, the MUD architecture and format allow to automate the definition of network access policies based on the MUD profile defined by the manufacturer. However, it should be noted that the instantiation of these profiles could depend on the network domain where the device is being deployed. Such profiles are included in a MUD file, which defines the behaviour associated with a certain device, using YANG [3] and JSON [4] standards. The process to obtain this file and the components involved are explained in the following subsection.
A. MUD ARCHITECTURE
The MUD architecture consists of four main components. Figure 1 shows the interactions among them for obtaining MUD files.
• Thing or Device, which is responsible for sending a MUD URL to indicate where the corresponding MUD file is hosted.
• Router or Switch to which the device is connected.
• MUD Manager, which is in charge (among other tasks) of requesting a MUD file based on a certain MUD URL • MUD File Server, a web server hosting MUD files As defined in the MUD standard, the process for obtaining a MUD file requires the Thing to communicate the location of the MUD file to the switch or router by using a MUD URL. Toward this end, the standard defines three alternatives: the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [60] , the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) [61] , and the use of the IEEE 802.1AR standard [62] to embed the MUD URL in a X.509 certificate. Furthermore, the standard recognises the possibility to consider other options for devices that are not able to communicate the MUD URL, or in scenarios with limited Internet connection. When the router or switch receives the MUD URL, such URL is forwarded to the MUD manager, which represents the core component of the architecture. Then, this entity requests the MUD file (and a signature file associated) to a certain MUD file server. After validating the corresponding signature, the MUD manager is also intended to configure the corresponding network components (e.g., a switch) based on the information contained in the MUD file. For that reason, it is also in charge of translating (and maintaining updated) MUD rules to specific network configurations [2] .
B. MUD MODEL
MUD files define the type of communications and access of a certain device in the form of policies or ACLs. Some examples of these restrictions could be ''allow the communication to devices of the same manufacturer'', ''allow the access to a specific DNS service'', or ''deny the access for a specific port''. MUD is based on YANG [3] standard to model such restrictions, and JSON [4] as a serialisation format.
A MUD file contains the ''mud'' and ''acls'' containers. The former defines different aspects related to the obtaining and validity period of a certain file. For example, the field ''mud-url'' identifies the MUD file itself, and the ''lastupdate'' specifies when the file was generated. In addition, the ''to-device-policy'' and ''from-device-policy'' containers represent access lists references by indicating the appropriate direction of a specific flow to define the communication pattern of the device. Consequently, the ''acls'' container defines those ACLs. It should be noted that it is based on the YANG Data Model for Network ACLs [3] , which is augmented by the MUD standard to define more expressive ACLs. For example, the nodes ''manufacturer'' and ''same-manufacturer'' enable the definition of policies to allow or deny the interaction with devices from the same manufacturer. Other fields allow to reference network components (e.g., ''controller'' or ''local-networks'') without the need to know the associated IP addresses.
The MUD model enables a standardised and flexible way to specify network policies. However, as discussed before, the provided semantics does not allow the specification of more fine-grained security aspects to be defined. In this paper, an extension of such model is proposed to generate and include additional restrictions through the integration of a testing methodology focused on IoT. 
IV. BUILDING AUGMENTED MUD PROFILES FROM SECURITY TESTING RESULTS
Based on the automated IoT security testing methodology and the MUD standard, this section describes the integrative approach to extend MUD profiles with the testing results provided by the application of such methodology. The main purpose is to detect and potentially mitigate a broad set of potential security attacks on a certain IoT device. Toward this end, the proposed work uses the methodology proposed in [8] , which, in turn, represents an instantiation of the ETSI riskbased security assessment and testing methodology [9] by using specific technologies and tools. Such methodology considers three main processes involved in the security assessment process for a certain device or component. On the one hand, Security Testing is intended to discover vulnerabilities by defining, implementing and executing different security tests. And on the other hand, Security Risk Assessment is in charge of the identification, estimation and evaluation of the risk associated to the different vulnerabilities. Moreover, the Treatment process aims to provide security countermeasures considering the risk evaluated by the previous phase. It should be noted that this process is not considered in [34] . In this direction, this paper describes a potential instantiation of the treatment process through the use, extension and enforcement of MUD profiles. An overview of the resulting approach is shown in Figure 2 , which is further detailed in the following subsections.
A. RISK-BASED SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND TESTING
The methodology proposed in [34] provides an integration between Security Risk Assessment and Security Testing processes by using different techniques (e.g., MBT) and tools to realise an automated approach for Security Assessment in IoT. While the mentioned work gives a detailed description of both processes, this work is focused on the testing activities, and how the corresponding results of the process can be used to enrich MUD profiles. According to Figure 2 , the security testing process embraces different activities to design, implement and execute the different tests. These activities are already proposed by the ETSI methodology, but it does not define any mechanism to implement them. In this direction, such activities are instantiated by using a combination of different techniques and testing approaches:
• Test design and implementation: In this phase, a set of test cases are derived and implemented to be executed in a certain environment. This instantiation uses the MBT approach to specify the different tests and associated behaviour. Furthermore, such tests are exported by using the CertifyIt tool [63] to create a set of JUnit tests. Adapters are used to cope with the particularities of each IoT device. They represent a middle interface between the JUnit tests and the device code. In addition, the approach is extended by integrating fuzzing testing in the generated adapter.
• Test environment set up & maintenance: It is intended to the setup tasks of the environment where the implemented tests are executed. This work uses a local environment composed by different devices, including a resource constrained IoT system. However, it should be noted that other testing environments can be used. For example, in [34] , the FIT IoT-LAB platform 3 is used, which represents a large-scale infrastructure for simulating more complex scenarios.
• Test execution, analysis and summary: During this activity, the execution of the tests provides a set of results that are analysed and summarised. For the test execution, this work considers the use of adapters, so that the different tests can be executed in the devices being used.
To link the adapter with the real device, different test commands are sent to the device through such adapter. After the execution of the test, a test report is generated with the corresponding results, and the specification of security aspects that can be used for the generation of the extended MUD profiles. The test report includes information about the tests themselves (e.g., if a certain test passed or failed), as well as information related to the cipher-suites, key sizes and cryptographic algorithms being used by the device. Furthermore, according to Figure 2 , it should be noted that different vulnerabilities to design the tests can be obtained from the risk assessment process through public databases (risk identification). Then, once the security testing processes are carried out, the corresponding test results are used by the risk estimation process to quantify the risk associated to the vulnerabilities discovered through the testing process. 3 https://www.iot-lab.info/ This process is instantiated by using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [64] , which is proposed by NIST as a vulnerability scoring system through a set of different security metrics. Finally, risk evaluation compares the result of the risk estimation with the security requirements needed in the context, which are identified in a previous step. While this paper is focused on the use of the testing methodology to enrich MUD profiles, a more detailed description of the security risk assessment process can be found in [34] .
B. TREATING SECURITY RISKS THROUGH EXTENDED MUD PROFILES
This work proposes the instantiation of the Treatment process that is considered in the ETSI risk-based security assessment and testing methodology [9] . For this purpose, two main activities are considered. On the one hand, the Profile Generation is intended to build extended MUD profiles by using the results generated by the two previous processes. On the other hand, the Profile Enforcement process is in charge on the enforcement of the restrictions specified in such profiles.
1) PROFILE GENERATION
The generation of the extended MUD profiles is built on two main aspects. First, the results of the risk assessment process are used to create an Assessment Report with the tests results and the risk assessment values from the previous processes. For this purpose, there is a need to define a suitable representation to capture the restrictions derived from the testing and assessment results. Second, the format of the access control lists used by the MUD model is extended to represent these restrictions, in order to build an augmented MUD profile.
For the generation of the assessment report, different schemes can be considered. The use of a standardised format is key to homogenise different security testing and assessment techniques, and to facilitate the comparison between the results provided by different methodologies. In this direction, the Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) and the Messaging Abuse Reporting Format (MARF) [65] were proposed to report abuse information in the case of the email service, in order to foster an automated processing approach. Moreover, the Common Vulnerabilities Reporting Framework (CVRF) [66] and the Extended Abuse Reporting Format (XARF) [67] are intended to report vulnerabilities and security incident information with a low expressiveness. An alternative approach is represented by XCCDF [11] , which is a standard considered in SCAP [68] . XCCDF uses an XML format to specify security checklists, benchmarks and configuration documentation, which allows to specify the tests and results of the assessment. It should be noted that XCCDF is intended to be used to automate the verification of checklists using the Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) [69] . While some limitations have been identified for the use of XCCDF in the IoT context [70] , the evolution of SCAP [41] aims to enhance different aspects of the current XCCDF specification to be considered in IoT. According to Figure 2 , it should be noted that the Extended MUD file is generated based on such Assessment Report and the Original MUD file associated to the device itself.
The second building block for the profile generation is the extension of the MUD model to represent additional security aspects in such Extended MUD file. It should be noted that the MUD specification is also based on the YANG Data Model for Network ACLs standard [3] . While it offers a standard format to represent network access restrictions, it does not provide the possibility to indicate other security restrictions on application-layer protocols, in order to realise a more fine-grained approach for specifying behavioural profiles. In fact, the MUD specification itself already considers potential extensions of the model; for example, to indicate a Domain Name System (DNS) name within the matches element. Based on this, an extension of such data model is proposed to allow more detailed access control policies for network and application layers, considering additional security aspects (e.g., cryptographic algorithms and ciphersuites) to allow/deny a certain communication. Furthermore, this model has been extended to control the access to specific resources provided by a certain device. This way, a more finegrained approach is realised in which communications are not allowed/denied to a certain device, but to a resource hosted by that device. As explained in Section III, the MUD model has two main elements, the ''mud'' and the ''acl'' containers. In particular, the ''acl'' container [3] is extended, according to Listing 1, through the definition of additional fields (in bold). It should be noted that some internal fields have been omitted for the sake of clarity, and they are detailed in the corresponding standard specification [3] .
For the definition of these new fields, a similar approach to the MUD specification has been followed. In the MUD model, the field of the network-layer protocol (e.g,. IPv4/IPv6) also indicates the transport-layer protocol (e.g., TCP or UDP) by following the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) notation [71] . Then, a block of the transport layer protocol (e.g., TCP or UDP) describes the network access control policies by indicating the set of allowed/denied connections adding information about the source and destination ports. According to Listing 1, an extra field ''application-protocol'' (line 34) has been defined to specify security restrictions on the application layer. Since IANA does not provide numeric identification for application layer protocols, the application protocol is defined though a string representing its name. This application layer protocol is further described with their associated policies (lines [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] . Furthermore, since different restrictions can be considered for each application-layer protocol, these fields could be repeated in the extended profile. The different restrictions are specified as part of the element matches (line 9).
In particular, two new conditions have been defined to restrict the maximum number of simultaneous connections for a certain protocol (''num-connections'') and the cryptographic keys and algorithms that should be used (''keys''). It is worth noting that both conditions are optional and additional restrictions could be defined to extend the functionality. Each condition has different attributes. On the one hand, ''num-connections'' defines the fields ''value'' and ''operator'' (as defined in the YANG standard [3] ) to represent the number of connections that the device will accept for that protocol. This way, potential Denial of Service (DoS) attacks can be mitigated. On the other hand, the field ''keys'' indicates the name of the algorithm (''alg'') following the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [72] standard, and the intended use of the key (''key_ops''), based on the JSON Web Key (JWK) standard [73] . Furthermore, following the JWA specification, the field ''crv'' represents a certain cryptographic curve in case of using algorithms and keys based on elliptic curves. An example of this extended MUD profile is described in Section VII. Finally, to control the access to specific resources in a certain device, the element ''resources'' (line 45) indicates which resources are available for that application layer protocol, and their associated url (''url''). This property can be repeated for each resource available. Inside, nested ACEs are defined to specify the access control policies related to the resource (''ace''), in which it is possible to use the high-level terms defined by the MUD specification (e.g., same-manufacturer), to increase the expressiveness. Furthermore, such ACEs have been extended to specify the action performed over the resource (e.g., GET or POST methods in the case of the CoAP protocol) through the element action (line 50).
2) PROFILE ENFORCEMENT
After the generation of the Extended MUD file, the different restrictions included in the profile must be enforced to properly restrict the communications to/from the corresponding device. Toward this end, four main processes involving the different components of the MUD architecture are employed:
• MUD Publication: During this process, the manufacturer of the device is responsible for uploading the extended MUD file into the corresponding MUD File Server. Furthermore, it publishes a signature file as the result of signing the MUD file.
• MUD Obtaining: The obtaining of the MUD file (and the associated signature file) is carried out by using a MUD URL, which indicates where the MUD and signature files are stored. According to the standard specification, the device can send the MUD URL to the MUD Manager through three different alternatives based on LLDP, DHCP and X.509 certificates. Then, the MUD Manager uses the MUD URL to access the MUD and signature files that were hosted by the manufacturer during the previous process.
• MUD Translation: Before the enforcement itself of the restrictions included in the MUD file, the different policies specified following the MUD model notation must be translated into specific network configurations to be able to enforce them. According to the MUD standard, the MUD manager is also in charge of this process, as well as of maintaining and updating potential changes of this mapping.
• MUD Enforcement: The translated policies can be enforced by different network and application layer components to restrict the communications of a certain device. It should be noted that the deployment of such policies could depend on the considered scenario. As mentioned in the MUD standard, a policy can be focused on the device protection through the enforcement in the closest access point; or it could be employed to limit the traffic within a network, so the policy is enforced as close to the Internet as possible. Recent works have proposed the use of SDN for the enforcement of MUD policies, such as [56] , which describes a publicly available implementation. 4 However, the high level policies introduced in the MUD, in particular the access control policies for application layer resources, can not be enforced using the SDN paradigm. It should be noted that the activities related to the Profile Enforcement process are further discussed in previous papers by considering SDN [7] and [56] . However, the use of SDN is typically considered to enforce network-layer restrictions, so it is not enough to control the access to specific resources at application layer. In this direction, this work proposes the combination of capability-based access control and XACML [12] , which could complement SDN-based approaches to enforce more fine-grained behavioural profiles of IoT devices.
To realize the capability-based access control approach, this work is based on [20] , in which capability tokens contain the access rights or permissions of a certain device over specific resources hosted by other entities. In particular, a capability token defines an identifier (ID), as well as the ''issued-time'' (ii), ''not-before'' (nb) and ''not-after'' (na) fields to restrict the validity time of the token. Furthermore, the ''issuer'' (is) field is used to identify the entity that issued the token, and its ''signature'' over the token (si). The ''subject'' (su) field references the entity to which the rights included in the token are granted. Regarding the resource, the token includes a ''device'' (de) (e.g., coap://device1.org) that identifies the device to which the token applies and the ''access-rights'' (ar) field, which represents the set of rights that the issuer has granted to the subject. This field includes the ''action'' (ac) (e.g., GET) over the resource, and the ''resource'' (re) itself (e.g., temperature).
For the generation of the token, the use of XACML is proposed. XACML is a standard specification that defines an attribute-based access control policy language, as well as an architecture and processing model to evaluate access requests according to the rules defined in the policies. This way, when a device wants to access to certain resource, it asks for a capability token though the XACML architecture. In particular, an initial request is performed by the device that is intercepted by an infrastructure component (e.g., the MUD manager). Then, this entity generates a XACML request to be sent to the Policy decision point (PDP), which evaluates the request against the stored policies in the Policy Retrieval Point (PRP). It should be noted that we assume that the corresponding MUD restrictions have been previously deployed in the PRP. Then, the PDP will send a XACML response with the result of the evaluation. If the access is permitted, the token will be generated and granted to the device; otherwise, the access is denied. Furthermore, to deal with the inherent constraints of typical IoT scenarios, the use of CBOR is proposed to encode the capability tokens using CBOR, in a similar way to the CWT standard [45] .
An application example of the resulting approach is performed over the EDHOC protocol, which is described in the next section.
V. ELLIPTIC CURVE DIFFIE-HELLMAN OVER COSE (EDHOC)
EDHOC [15] represents an ongoing IETF standardisation effort for a lightweight authenticated key exchange to be used in IoT constrained scenarios. This section motivates the chosen of EDHOC for the application example in Section VI and describes the details of the protocol to understand the insights necessary to define the security tests. VOLUME 7, 2019 A. AUTHENTICATED KEY EXCHANGE IN IOT OSCORE [18] has been recently standardised by the IETF as a protocol for protecting CoAP messages in the application layer. OSCORE is intended to be used by IoT constrained devices by using CBOR [16] and COSE [17] standards to provide end-to-end security properties in scenarios with intermediate entities, such as proxies. According to the standard specification, OSCORE requires a security context to be agreed between client and server. In this direction, EDHOC has been proposed for the establishment of the OSCORE security context. It represents a lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol, which has received an increasing interest from the standardisation perspective with the recent establishment of the IETF LAKE WG. Given its low computational cost and the reduced overhead, EDHOC can be a security alternative to the DTLS handshake protocol for IoT devices, specially in scenarios with tight resource constraints (e.g., low-power wide-area networks (LPWAN) [74] ).
EDHOC allows the establishment of a symmetric key between a client and server entities. It implements the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm (ECDH) [75] with ephemeral keys to provide Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) [76] . In addition, EDHOC establishes two authentication modes with the purpose of confirming the identity of the involved entities based on public keys (i.e., raw public keys (RPK) and certificates (Certs)), and preshared key (PSK). This way, the authentication and the shared key generation processes remain independent of each other. Moreover, EDHOC defines a three-message exchange, which can be embedded as payload in an application protocol like CoAP, although other application protocols can be adopted to carry out this exchange. Furthermore, EDHOC messages are encoded following the CBOR representation and protected by the COSE standard, which are already used by OSCORE.
B. EDHOC MESSAGE EXCHANGE
For the description of the message exchange, it should be noted that the version 08 of EDHOC [77] has been considered and implemented for the application of the proposed approach. Figure 3 shows the EDHOC exchange between Client and Server entities by considering the PSK authentication mode. In this case, the EDHOC exchange starts with MSG 1, which is sent by the Client and includes the message type (MSG_TYPE), a unique session identifier for this entity (S C ), a nonce (N C ), its ephemeral public key (EPH _PK C ), the supported cryptographic algorithms (i.e., the curves (Curves C ), KDF (HKDFs C ) and AEAD (AEADs C ) algorithms) and an identifier associated to the PSK (PSKID) used to perform the authentication process. In the case of authentication based on public keys (RPK or Certs), it is assumed that the Client has the Server's public part (PK S ), while the Server previously received the Client's public key (PKC). Furthermore, in this case, MSG 1 contains the signature algorithms supported by the Client SIGS C (instead of the PSKID). When the Server receives this message, it validates the S C and, in case of the PSK mode, it uses the PSKID to get the key pre-shared with the Client. After this, the shared secret (Secret) is computed. For this purpose, the Client runs the DH algorithm with its ephemeral private key (EPH _SK _C) and the EPH _PK _S. Similarly, the Server runs such algorithm with its ephemeral secret key (EPH _SK _S) and the EPH _PK _C. Then, it sends the MSG 2, which includes the corresponding MSG_TYPE, the S C , a unique session identifier (S S ), a nonce (N S ), its ephemeral public key (EPH _PK S ), the selected cryptographic algorithms (i.e., the KDF (HKDF S ) and AEAD (AEAD S ) algorithms) and a COSE object encrypted by using the AEAD algorithm, the secret and the PSK as salt (COSE_ENC_2) (in RPK and Certs, the salt is zero). The COSE contains the MSG 1 and all data included in MSG 2. Therefore, this COSE object authenticates the Server and protects the integrity of MSG 1 and MSG 2.
When the Client receives the MSG 2, it validates the S S and deciphers the (COSE_ENC_2). Then, it sends the MSG 3 including the corresponding MSG_TYPE, the S S and a new COSE object encrypted as before (COSE_ENC_3) that contains MSG 1, MSG 2 and MSG 3. Thus, the COSE_ENC_3 is used to authenticate the Client and for ensuring the integrity of the EDHOC exchange. After receiving this message, the Server validates the S S and deciphers the COSE_ENC_3.
After this, the symmetric key (SymmetricKey) is computed by applying a key derivation function. In particular, the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) [78] is used to carried out this derivation operation, due to it is proposed by the EDHOC specification. The computation of the symmetric key is performed as follows (for public key, a null value is used instead of the PSK): SymmetricKey = hkdf − sha256(PSK , Secret, COSE_KDF_Context( AES_CCM _64_64_128 ), 16) where the COSE_KDF_Cxt(AlgorithmID) structure is defined by following [17] and [15] :
COSE_KDF_Cxt(AlgID) = (AlgID, (null, null, null) , 16 , , sha256(sha256(MSG1|MSG2)|MSG3)) The HKDF makes use of the SHA-256 as hash function including the following parameters: the Secret, a COSE_KDF_Cxt(AlgID) structure, the PSK (or null in public key mode) and the shared symmetric key length (16-byte length) . Finally, it should be noted that such COSE_KDF_Cxt(AlgID) structure includes a parameter called AlgID, which indicates the algorithm that will be employed to protect application data.
VI. APPLYING MBT-BASED SECURITY TESTING TO AN EDHOC IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, the application of the security testing methodology to analyse different security properties of the implementation of the EDHOC protocol in a certain IoT device es described. The main activities of this process are described in Section IV-A, and more details can be found in [34] . It should be noted an EDHOC implementation based on the COSE-C library, 5 and the erbium library 6 to transport the EDHOC messages over CoAP has been developed. The device offers the resource /edhoc to launch a security association renovation process, established previously by a bootstrapping exchange [79] . As an example, we consider that only the controller (i.e., the entity responsible for providing network access to the device) should be authorised to do that.
A. IDENTIFYING THE TESTS
As a previous step to the application of the testing methodology, the set of tests to be performed has to be identified. Toward this end, a fixed set of different security properties to be assessed has been considered, namely confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and authorisation. Table 1 shows the set of identified tests (99 in total), which are classified according to such properties. It is worth noting 5 https://github.com/cose-wg/COSE-C 6 http://people.inf.ethz.ch/mkovatsc/erbium.php that some of the tests are included in several properties, for example, sending a non-valid PSKID could be related to authentication, since it identifies the PSK, or availability in case the size of such field could provoke a buffer overflow in the device. In the second column, description, describes the set of tests (e.g., testing the integrity for each field of the first EDHOC message), whereas the third column, number of tests, identifies the number of tests generated from that set (e.g., a test for each field in a certain EDHOC message).
For the sake of clarity, and as an example of the application of the testing methodology to enrich MUD profiles, in this paper, the focus is on the property availability. The inherent nature of IoT makes devices more vulnerable to create botnets [1] , which can be used to launch more complex DoS attacks over Internet services. Therefore, the example is focused on this property. Table 2 details the test steps of the selected examples.
Based on this, three tests have been selected for availability in which non-valid values of different fields are sent to the Server as part of MSG 1. In particular, the fields Curves C , HKDFs C and AEADs C , which represent different cryptographic algorithms and parameters. It should be noted that such non-valid values could include non-existing algorithms, or values with an invalid size that could provoke buffer overflow errors. The tests will pass if the Server is able to detect the invalid value and finishes the EDHOC exchange with an error, instead of collapsing. Furthermore, the DoS attack in which the number of simultaneous connections is gradually increased with the Server, has also been considered.
B. TEST DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
After describing the identified tests, they are designed and implemented (see Section IV-A). This section describes the different tasks for the design and implementation of such tests.
1) GENERATING THE FUNCTIONAL MODEL
As an initial step, MBT is used to design the corresponding model of the EDHOC scenario. For this purpose, as shown in Figure 4 , six entities have been defined: the iotDevice (EDHOC Client), the server (EDHOC Server), the three EDHOC messages, as well as a network sniffer, which is used in the confidentiality and integrity tests.
Furthermore, additional fields have been included to emulate the tests identified in the previous step. Specifically, the field of each EDHOC message, the operations required for sending and receiving such messages (send() and receive(), and the operations to simulate an attack (i.e., modifyMessage() and eavesdropping()). The variable STATE is used to control the state machine of the protocol. In addition, a set of enumerates represents different field types (VALID_FIELD, NON_VALID_FIELD and OTHER_FIELD).
The operations required by EDHOC and associated tests are modelled through the OCL language. For each operation, it is required to specify a set of parameters, preconditions and postconditions. The preconditions allow to control when a certain operation can be executed according to the sequence of the protocol. For example, in the send() operation for the iotDevice, the preconditions force to send MSG 3, only after receiving MSG 2. Moreover, postconditions are used to emulate the protocol behaviour, for example by changing the state of the iotDevice after sending a certain message. The operation receive() of the iotDevice can be only called if MSG 2 has been sent, which is controlled through the STATE variable in the preconditions. The postconditions control the received values for each field, leading to an ERROR STATE if a certain field is NON_VALID, or to a NON_VALID_COSE (containing the hash) if the value has been modified. If everything is correct, the state changes to RECEIVED2. It should be noted that the operations send() and receive() follow a similar procedure for the server entity. Moreover, an additional function is used for receiving errors, receiveError(), which is also similar for server and iotDevice entities. It can only be called if the state of the another entity is error, and it is used for notification purposes, so it does not have postconditions. Then, an additional function checkState(), is defined to check if the process was performed correctly through the observation of a variable. This is used to determine if a certain test passed or not. In addition, Listing 2. ''Test purpose for availability (Non-valid HKDF)''. several operations are defined to simulate potential attack situations. In this sense, the operation eavesdropping() is only used for modelling purposes; then, when the tests are exported, this function is linked to the corresponding sniffer to capture the network traffic. Furthermore, the operation modifyMessage() takes as input the message number and the field to be changed. In the postconditions, the value of the input field is modified to OTHER_FIELD. It is worth noting that some tags are used to label certain parts of the code (e.g., AIM:SG2_RECEIVED_INVALID_HKDF is used to specify that a non-valid HKDF has been received). These tags are intended to define the tests through test purposes, which are further described below.
2) DESCRIBING THE TEST PURPOSES
After describing the functional model, the test purposes have to be defined according to the test description that defined in the previous step. It is used the Test Purpose language [63] , which is based on regular expressions to represent a certain testing scenario in terms of states to be reached and operations to be called. Instead of specifying all the protocol steps to reach a certain situation, the tags in the code can be used. For example, in the availability test for the HKDF field shown in Listing 2, the tags MSG1_RECEIVED_INVALID_HKDF and IOT_RECEIVED_ERROR can be used to receive an invalid HKDF and reach the error state instead of specifying each operation.
Furthermore, instead of writing the different test purposes, tags are used to generate all the different behaviours specified in the code. For example, all the availability tests for MSG 1 cab be created by generating all the tests with tags MSG1_RECEIVED_INVALID_field.
3) GENERATING THE TESTS
Once the different tests are specified, the CertifyIt tool [63] is used to check if such tests have been correctly defined according to the model. If so, these tests are exported in JUnit language (although other languages, such as XML or TTCN [9] are also possible). The main goal of the use of JUnit is the systematic and automatic testing of security properties in IoT devices for improving efficiency and scalability. As a result, a JUnit test suite and an adapter consisting on two interfaces is generated. These interfaces include the corresponding testing operations (operations interface) and the different field types (types interface). Both interfaces are implemented to link the real device and server with the test suite by indicating the specific operations and values to be employed.
The code in Listing 3 shows the JUnit test correspondent to the availability test for the HKDF field defined at the beginning. The rest of the selected tests follow a similar structure. 
4) IMPLEMENTING THE TESTS
To link the generated tests with the real devices, the mentioned adapter interfaces have to be implemented in both entities, that is, client and server. It should be noted that the tests themselves are sent to the corresponding entity through different commands via the USB serial. In the operations interface of one of the both entities, the USB serial is open and the another entity (i.e., client or server) is set up. The result given by the corresponding entity is processed to decide if the test passed or failed. It should be noted that a simple and formal notation to represent the different commands in a compact representation format is used. In particular, the notation is MESSAGE_NUMBER:FIELD:FIELD_VALUE, in which the MESSAGE_NUMBER takes the values 1, 2 or 3, the FIELD is codified in a number or letter to simplify the command (e.g., HKDF is equal to 6) and the FIELD_VALUE is the value that the real field will take in the test. Listing 4 shows the operation to send MSG 1, in which it is codified the command of sending an invalid HKDF (input).
Then, the types interface determines how the field values of a command have to be filled. This interface provides operations to get specific values for each type defined at a high-level view in the model (e.g., INVALID_HKDF, OTHER_HKDF, VALID_HKDF). For valid values (VALID, OTHER), a random value is selected between the accepted values for this field. Nevertheless, for non-valid values, fuzzing testing is used to generate random values with different lengths, in order to stress the system. This way, the testing approach described in [34] is extended by considering buffer overflow issues or attacks derived from an incorrect implementation or inappropriate exception management. As the values are randomly generated, each fuzzing test is executed several times to obtain a percentage of resistance against nonvalid values for the different fields of the EDHOC messages. In case the system does not crash but it finishes correctly EDHOC, the test is considered fail. This means that the implementation is not acting according to the EDHOC specification, and it could also affect other security properties. For example, if the length of a certain value is too short, it may affect the authentication (e.g., in the case of the nonce used to identify sessions). Therefore, these tests could be used to detect potential vulnerabilities related to other security properties. It should be pointed out that the fuzzing testing technique was integrated in the types interface, so the MBT approach is extended through an enriched security testing methodology. While more sophisticated fuzzers can be used to generate invalid values, it is out of the scope of this paper.
C. TEST EXECUTION, ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY
The last step of the process is to run the EDHOC implementation, as well as the JUnit test suite previously generated in the real devices. This way, the JUnit test suite is executed to check if the real device passes or fail the different tests, in order to obtain the corresponding results. It should be noted that real IoT devices have been employed to deploy the client and server entities for the different tests. Specifically, the device used is a PIC32MX795F512L, which presents a frequency of 80 MHz, 512 KB ROM and 128KB RAM. The setup of this hardware is actually part of the Test environment set up & maintenance (Section IV-A). Figure 5 shows an overview of the execution flow for a test. When a certain test of the JUnit test suite is executed (step 1), each operation (step 2) is translated into the real source code by using the operations interface. In the example, the operation send() is used to send the first message (MSG1) with a non-valid HKDF (NON_VALID_HKDF). If the high-level type needs to be translated to a concrete value (NON_VALID_HKDF in this case), the operations interface requests this value to the types interface (step 3). Then, this interface generates a random value for the type (i.e., ''qwerty''), which is sent to the operations interface (step 4). Then, with this information, the operations interface translates the high-level operation to a command, which is sent to the device by using the notation described in Section VI-B.4 (step 5). When the device executes the test, it sends the result (OK/ERROR) to the operations interface (step 6), and such result is forwarded to the JUnit test suite (step 7). Then, this component generates a test report including the results derived from the different tests. This report is sent to the tester entity (step 8), and it is used in the Security Risk Assessment process specified in Section IV to generate the Assessment Report described in the next section.
It should be noted that the use of JUnit allows a the execution and analysis of the results in an automated way. Other specific tests (e.g., related to confidentiality) require further analysis to get the information related to the cryptographic algorithms, key size or percentage of encrypted data from the network traffic trace. Table 3 shows the results for the selected example tests. As shown, all the tests failed. In particular, the tests related with non-valid fields have two reasons of failure. On the one hand, a too large length of the field derives on a buffer overflow due to non-controlled exceptions in the EDHOC library. And on the other hand, the value could reference to an existing cryptographic suite but based on an invalid cryptographic algorithm (e.g., based on a too small key size). It could mean that the library is not behaving according to the EDHOC specification, and it could impact on the security level. For example, the use of an invalid AEAD algorithm, could make possible to invert the hash in order to perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. Furthermore, the lack of a suitable exception treatment could provoke additional issues in case the management of non-existing (or random) values are not contemplated in the library. Finally, the test related to DoS attacks was executed with a variable number of client devices (from 1 to 8 simultaneous connections) to check the resistance of the server implementation to this attack. As shown in the first graph of Figure 6 , the implementation is not able to finish more than 3 simultaneous exchanges both in PSK and RAW modes. To complement this information, the second graph of Figure 6 represents the percentage of connections in which the server was able to finish the EDHOC exchange. In EDHOC-RAW (that is, using RPK authentication mode), it is completely impossible to complete successfully any of 3 or more simultaneous connections, and for 2 connections, it is able to finish the 83.3% of them. In EDHOC-PSK, the results are a bit better, and for 2 simultaneous connections, it can finish the 86.6% of them. In addition, it is able to deal with 4 simultaneous connections, finishing the 36.6% of those connections. However, this percentage highly decreases to zero for 4 and more simultaneous connections. At this point, the different test results are assessed through the Security Risk Assessment process (Section IV-A by using the CVSS system to quantify the risk associated to each test. A more detailed of this process can be found in [34] .
VII. CREATING EXTENDED PROFILES FROM TESTING RESULTS
Based on the testing and risk assessment results generated from the previous process, this section describes how such aspects are used to generate an extended MUD profile. Toward this end, it is assumed that there is already a MUD file for the device used for the tests. This MUD file is extended to reflect such results, which are included in an Assessment Report.
A. ASSESSMENT REPORT GENERATION BASED ON XCCDF
As mentioned in Section IV-B.1, the use of standard approach to represent tests and assessment results is crucial to homogenise the different security assessment methodologies. In this direction, XCCDF [11] is used to report such results. It is a NIST standard, which is supported by SCAP [68] . It should be noted that the next version of SCAP is intended to enhance XCCDF aspects to be considered in IoT scenarios [41] According to the specification, XCCDF documents contain a Benchmark element, which contains one or more elements, such as Rule, Value, TestResult and Group. Optionally it may include the element Profile to customise the benchmarking. Furthermore, a Groups is a container that holds other Rules, Values, and/or Groups. In the case of TestResult, it describes the results of a test or checking in a certain device. It should be noted that there is a TestResult element per each benchmarking run that contains a set of rule-result elements and the score associated to the test. Therefore, this format allows to specify the tests (Rule) executed for each property (Group) and the results (result) obtained from them (score).
Listing 5 show an excerpt of the XCCDF Assessment Report generated from the application of the testing methodology explained in the previous section. The availability tests are included in the group ''availability'' (line 1), and it has a description indicating that the tests of this group are related to the availability security property (line 3). Each rule or test is identified by an id, a boolean indicating if the rule is being evaluated or not (selected) (lines 5 and 9), a title (lines 6 and 10) and a description (lines 7-11).
After defining the different tests by using the Rule element, the XCCDF document includes a block to specify the results of executing such tests, TestResult. This element (line 14) contains one block rule-result per rule executed. Each ruleresult (lines 17 and 23) references the id defined in the previous block group, when the test was executed by using the properties start-time and end-time, and the severity, which could be associated to the risk assessment process according to [34] . Then, the result element indicates if the tests passed or failed (lines 18 and 24), and additional information as part of the metadata element. This element can be used to include the information related to the risk assessment process as part of the overall methodology [34] . This way, the CVSS vector, impact-metric, is codified as specified in the CVSS standard (lines 20 and 26). It is possible to add additional information from the different tests, such as the maximum number of simultaneous connections that the server supports (element Value) (lines [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . At the end of the TestResult element, it is mandatory the element Score, indicating the total score achieved in the security assessment process. In this case, it is specified the mean value of the CVSS risk scores achieved for the availability property, ''8.275'' (line 35), following the methodology in [34] .
It should be noted that XCCDF also provides some additional elements (fixtext and fix) to express potential countermeasure, in order to fix a potential vulnerability. Nevertheless, the expressiveness is limited to scripts and bash commands, so it does not fit the needs of IoT, in which each device could use different underlying protocols and technologies [70] . However, the NIST is working on a new SCAP version that could fit the needs of IoT devices [41] , so in the future this field could be used to describe additional countermeasures based on testing results
B. GENERATING THE EXTENDED MUD FILE
As described in Section IV-B, an Extended MUD file is generated based on an existing MUD file for a certain device, and the Assessment Report generated from the security assessment process. Based on the report generated in the previous section, this subsection describes how such results are used to generate an augmented MUD profile, in order to provide a more fine-grained approach to the security profile of a certain device. In particular, the extended MUD file for this scenario is shown in 6, wherein the extended security aspects are highlighted (in bold), and the remain of the file represents the Original MUD file.
Based on this, Table 4 shows an overview of the policies and their source (a specific test represented in the Assessment Report, or the Original MUD file). It should be noted that the policy already included in the MUD file allows the UDP communication from the controller to the device by using the ports 1250 and 2500. This policy and the one derived from the DoS test represent security restrictions at network level. They limit the access based on the IPs, ports and connections. Furthermore, the policies related with non valid fields establish restrictions at the application layer, by restricting the communication to specific cryptographic algorithms and keys.
The generated policies are included in the corresponding ACL container of the MUD file (in bold in Listing 6) . Although in the listing only restrictions from the controller to the device are provided, the same conditions also apply from the device to the controller communication. The extension allows to specify the two protocols involved in the application layer, EDHOC and CoAP. In this sense, the field applicationprotocol included in the udp (line 15) indicates that the application layer protocol used is coap. At the same time, the block of the item coap (line 25) indicates by means of the application-protocol field that CoAP embeds the edhoc protocol. In this scenario, a CoAP resource (/edhoc) is considered, in addition to its associated access control policies. The resource and policies associated to /edhoc are embedded in the resource block (lines 27 to 37), which specifies the url (/edhoc) and the ace with its name (authn-edhoc) and the associated access control policies. In this case, the resource /edhoc is only allowed to the device's controller through a GET action (lines 29 to 36). This is specified in the block matches by using the MUD model's term my-controller and the proposed extension action.
After the coap block, the edhoc block (line 39) contains the restrictions derived from the security testing process. On the one hand, the policy related with the limitation of the simultaneous connections is codified with the element numconnections (line 40), which indicates a value less or equal than 2, since 2 is the most restrictive number of connections taking into account both authentication modes of the EDHOC library (RAW and PSK). And on the other hand, the policies related with the algorithms and key lengths are codified with the element keys (line 44), indicating their usage (with the key_ops field) (lines 48 and 52), the algorithms used (lines 46 and 51) and the information about the curve used (crv field in line 47), following the notation of [72] . In this example, the device should use the ECDH-ES key derivation using a particular elliptic curve (i.e., P-256) and AES-128 with a hash of 64 or 128 length to check the integrity of Listing 6. Extended MUD file with policies from tests. the data. In case there are multiple algorithms allowed (e.g., AES128CCM-HS64 or AES128CCM-HS128), the first one has priority.
C. ENFORCING THE EXTENDED MUD FILE
According to the process described in Section IV, the resulting Extended MUD file is published, obtained and enforced through the different components of the MUD architecture. In this sense, while the standard provides different options to obtain the MUD files, the enforcement of the corresponding restrictions is not addressed. Recent works, such as [56] , already describe the use of SDN for the enforcement of MUD files. However, it should be noted that the extension of the MUD model to consider additional application layer restrictions requires complementary approaches to enforce such rules. This is the case of the access control policies over resources (/edhoc). For this purpose, the usage of capability tokens in combination with XACML is proposed to define and apply such policies.
Listing 7 shows the authorisation policy ''The resource/ edhoc should be only accessible by the device's controller'' Listing 7. XACML authorisation policy for /edhoc. Listing 8. XACML request to access to /edhoc. codified in XACML. This policy has been generated from the content provided in the Extended MUD file. The resource (/edhoc) is described in the resource element (lines 11 to 17), inside the target element, whereas the subject field is defined as the controller (lines 4 to 10). The action allowed is defined in the action (lines 19 to 27) and the result of the policy (permit or deny) is specified in the rule element. The result of the policy (Permit, line 29) for a specific action (get, line 24) is obtained if the subject is a controller (line 6). This policy is stored in the PRP database.
When the controller wants to access to the resource/edhoc, it requests a capability token indicating the action and resource to which it wants to access. Then, a XACML request is sent to the PDP to verify the permissions of the controller device to access to that resource. Listing 8 shows an exam-ple of XACML request for that resource. There are three main elements in a XACML request. The first (lines 2 to 6) is used to specify the attributes of the device requesting for access. In this case, the device has the attribute devi-ceID=controller. The second element (lines 7 to 11) describes the resource over it is requesting access (/edhoc). Finally, the third component (lines 12 to 16) is used to describe the action that the requester wants to perform over the resource (action-id = get). As a result of request evaluation, the PDP generates a XACML response with the result. Listing 9 shows the XACML response for the previous request. As the subject field matches the target component in the policy, the controller is allowed to perform the get action over the resource /edhoc (permit, line 3).
In this example, as the PDP has verified that the controller is allowed to access to /edhoc, a token will be generated and granted to it. Listing 10 shows an example of capability token codified in CBOR, which is issued to the controller identified in su (lines 15 to 17) to access to the resource/edhoc (lines 36 to 38) of the device coap://d1.com/ (lines 19 to 21). The access is only allowed through the get method (line 33). In this case, the entity that generated and signed (lines 23 to 25) the token is iss@example.com (lines 11 to 13). The rest of parameters specify the validity time of the token. After receiving the token, the controller includes such credential in the request to the resource /edhoc to prove that it is allowed to do that.
The content of the capability token follows a similar approach to the recent CWT standard [45] , but including the access rights of the requesting entity. In this direction, it should be noted that a recent standardisation effort is represented by the ''Authorisation Information Format (AIF)'' [80] , which is intended to represent such access rights in a similar way to the use of the capability token. Therefore, the content of the token described in Listing 10 could be considered as the combination between CWT and AIF approaches. As already mentioned, the use of capabilitybased access control and XACML is complementary to SDN mechanisms for the enforcement of network-layer restrictions, which are also contained in MUD files. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
The development of the IoT paradigm is characterised by the heterogeneity associated to devices, networks, and the underlying protocols and technologies. For that reason, there is a need to provide a unified view of the security level of an IoT environment where different systems are enabled to interact among each other. Toward this end, this work proposed the application of a security testing methodology to IoT scenarios based on different testing techniques and tools to automate the process. Based on this, the usage of the results of such methodology is used for the definition of the expected security behaviour of a certain device. For this purpose, the recent MUD standard is employed, whose model has been extended for the detection and mitigation of different potential security attacks, beyond network level restrictions. Additionally, the usage of XCCDF is proposed as a standard format to represent the test results. In this way, the proposal fosters an inter-operable approach to sharing testing results among different platforms and scenarios. Finally, we address the enforcement of security restrictions through XACML and capability-based access control, in order to complement SDN deployments to drive the security behaviour of IoT devices. The resulting methodology is applied to EDHOC, which represents a standardisation effort for the development of a lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol for IoT constrained scenarios. As future work, we will analyse the inter-dependencies among the intended security behaviour of different IoT devices, and the integration with SDN mechanisms to realise a comprehensive enforcement architecture.
